The R D Pradhan Committee, set up by the Maharashtra government to inquire into the lapses leading to the November 26, 2008, terrorist attack on Mumbai, has found that senior officers in the state government do not even look at crucial intelligence reports, including those coming from the Union home ministry and the Intelligence Bureau. These reports, according to the committee, are merely forwarded from desk to desk and handled by junior "desk officers" who are not equipped to appreciate the complexities of such reports, says a report in Times of India.
In a scathing indictment of the then Mumbai police commissioner Hasan Gafoor, the committee in its report says that during such a crisis the commissioner "should have been in the command centre in the control room which might have helped in preventing duplication of efforts by different police units". Gafoor, the committee observes, did not even follow the standard operating practice, according to which ATS chief Hemant Karkare and joint commissioner (crime) Rakesh Maria should have been in the field and K L Prasad, joint commissioner (law and order), should have been handling the control room.
It points out that Gafoor sent Prasad to the Taj Hotel and asked Maria to take charge of the control room. It has also found lack of cohesion and communication in the internal working of the Mumbai police commissioner's office. The committee has, however, appreciated the role of Rakesh Maria and his colleagues in the control room in handling the crisis. Maria has recently come under attack from Vinita Kamte, the wife of the slain police officer Ashok Kamte, who has accused him of not sending police help to Kamte and his two colleagues, ATS chief Karkare and senior inspector Vijay Salaskar. She has said that timely help from Maria could have saved their lives.
Former IAS officer R D Pradhan, who headed the committee, was Union home secretary in the Rajiv Gandhi government; he has also been governor of Arunachal Pradesh. The other member of the committee was V Balachandran, former special secretary, Cabinet Secretariat. The report, obtained by us, has not been made public despite being submitted to chief minister Ashok Chavan about six months ago.
Warning against air attacks on the city in future, the committee says: "One should not overlook possibility of air-borne attacks on targets in the city in future. With increasing use of helicopters by the government as well as non-official parties one may conceive a helicopter being taken over. As aviation security is with the central authorities, it is suggested that this matter may be taken up for studies and necessary security measures worked out."
The committee says the Mumbai police responded to the 26/11 attacks "in a manner that they usually respond to a law and order situation". "By the time the police had reached the spot the terrorists (except in CST) had already positioned themselves on higher levels at vantage locations after the initial killings from where they could fire upon and lob grenades at the approaching police parties. On the other hand, the policemen were in the usual law & order uniform mostly equipped to perform normal policing duties. It was commendable that some policemen had rushed with only lathis (cane/ bamboo sticks) to face the terrorists ."
The committee says there is "total confusion in the processing of intelligence alerts at the level of state government" . "In the DGP's office, presently all intelligence alerts are mechanically forwarded to operational units either by DGP's office (sometime with a DO letter) or ATS which partially functions under DGP. This is not adequate," it notes.
It has found that the principal secretary (law and order, home), normally a senior IPS Officer, performs merely secretarial work of handling paper work. "He must take active interest in keeping under constant watch the security scenario and requirements of police to face operational situations, not only in Mumbai city but in other sensitive urban/ rural places in Maharashtra," it says.
Pointing out that there had been several intelligence reports from August 2006 onwards indicating that the LeT was making preparations to "infiltrate fidayeen" into India by the sea route — 6 alerts on the possibility of sea-borne attacks, 11 on the possibility of multiple and simultaneous attacks and 3 on the possibility of commando attacks — the committee says "an overall assessment and proper analysis of these reports would have revealed a strong indication that some major terrorist action was being planned against Mumbai. The existing mechanism to make such an overall assessment was inadequate."
The committee regrets that the managements of the Taj and Oberoi hotels had not implemented certain important security advice given by DCP Zone-1 "because of their own policy perspective as hospitality industry". It says there was no request from Taj or other hotels to augment police security for them despite the police having shared intelligence alerts with them.
The report praises constable Arun Jadhav, who was in the same vehicle as Karkare, Kamte and Salaskar. Jadhav showed presence of mind and not only saved himself but also relayed the information that Kasab and Ismail took away the police vehicle and fled. This act led to the arrest of Kasab and the killing of Ismail by police. The report regrets that Jadhav's role has not been adequately recognized.
