He was pulled out as Director General, National Cadet Corps and foisted on the 4 Infantry Division as the GOC, which the Brooks-Bhagat report criticised given that he had not been involved with combat troops for a considerable length of time.
The report, sources said, is also critical of his predecessor Maj Gen Niranjan Prasad under whom the Division lost at Namka Chu.
The report highlights indecision at Army Headquarters and how field formations would faced problems getting clear orders or clarifications from the top brass in Delhi.
In this context, Western Army Commander Lt Gen Daulet Singh, who was responsible for the campaign in Ladakh, has come in for praise. In fact, the report firmly concludes that the campaign in the western sector of the boundary was conducted far better than the eastern theatre.
The specific instance about Lt Gen Singh relates to his decision to move two battalions deployed on the Indo-Pak western front to the site of battle in the north.
The report, sources said, recounts how Singh kept writing to Army Headquarters to seek approval to move troops from the Pakistan border but received no response.
Finally, he took the initiative and moved the battalions on his own to Chushul. This has been highlighted by Brooks-Bhagat as a rare example of better military leadership.
To an extent, the report also clarifies the famously known orders from the government asking the Army to “throw out the Chinese” by also putting on record the second line “at a time and place of Army's choosing” .
The report, however, does not get into the events of previous months leading up to the conflict, especially aspects like the much criticised ‘forward policy' that led to creation of several frontline posts without the logistics to sustain them — an act deemed provocative by the Chinese.
Besides these details, the report reflects the pain over the loss of thousands of soldiers; and ends on a very sombre note, quoting a few lines from a poem by First World War soldier-poet Wilfred Owen — lines which no one is able to recall.
The operative portion of the report is less than 150 pages. It concludes with lines from World War I English soldier-poet Wilfred Owen.
The report says levels of stores and equipment did not constitute a significant handicap. Poor military leadership was the main cause for the debacle.
The campaign in the north under Western Command was better conducted than operations in the east.
4 Infantry Division retreated “without putting up a fight”. Maj Gen A S Pathania wanted a second chance to fight as a sepoy after withdrawing his division in panic.
4 Corps Commander Lt Gen B M Kaul criticised for his poor command.
Western Army Commander Lt Gen Daulet Singh praised for showing better initiative.
