There is no direct comment on then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru anywhere in the letter or in the report, which confines itself to the conduct of military operations.
The important revelatory aspect of the Brooks-Bhagat report is its conclusion that shortages in ammunition and equipment were not among the primary reasons for the defeat.
In fact, the report, sources said, makes it clear that much has been stated about the “poor quality” of equipment and weapons making the Army unfit for battle.
The authors have put on record that in their considered view “the levels of stores and equipment didn't constitute a significant handicap”.
Instead, they have identified poor military leadership as the main reason for the Army not having fought better than it did.
The report is in four volumes, but its main operative content is less than 150 pages, typed single space in foolscap paper with corrections made by hand in ink.
The rest of the report comprises essentially annexures, minutes of meetings, operational maps and key pieces of communication.
The report was commissioned by Gen Chaudhuri, who took over as Army Chief after the war, as an internal Army report to look into just the conduct of military operations since hostilities began in early October 1962 till November 20 when China announced a unilateral ceasefire.
For the job, he picked Lt Gen Henderson Brooks who was GOC 11 Corps in Jalandhar and had not participated in the operations.
The report was submitted in April 1963 and sent to the Defence Ministry with Chaudhuri's detailed covering note.
