"An unsound military plan based on invalid assumptions, launched with little preparations and in total disregard to the regional and international environment, was bound to fail. That may well have been the reason for its secrecy. It was a total disaster."
"Whatever little I know, took a while to emerge, since General Musharraf had put a tight lid on Kargil. Three years later, a study commenced by GHQ to identify issues of concern at the lowest levels of command, was forcefully stopped by him. 'What is your intent?' he asked.
The intrusion was clearly intended to dominate the supply line to Siachen and cut off the glacier for an invasion by Pakistani troops.
"It certainly wasn't a defensive manoeuvre. There were no indications of an Indian attack. We didn't pre-empt anything; nothing was on the cards. I was then heading the Analysis Wing of Inter Services Intelligence and it was my job to know," he wrote.
"To say that occupying empty spaces along the Line of Control was not a violation of any agreement and came under the purview of the local commander is astounding. This area was with the Indians as a result of Shimla Agreement, and there had been no major violation of the Line of Control since 1971."
Describing how Pakistan army soldiers died after they were isolated and came under the Indian counter attack, Aziz said assumptions were made by the military leadership that the Indian Army would not be able to dislodge the fighters from the heights.
