Yemen al-Qaeda emir left blueprint for waging jihad
Timbuktu,Aug 10: A year before he was caught on an intercept discussing the terror plot that prompted this week's sweeping closure of U.S. embassies abroad, al-Qaeda's top operative in Yemen laid out his blueprint for
Timbuktu,Aug 10: A year before he was caught on an intercept discussing the terror plot that prompted this week's sweeping closure of U.S. embassies abroad, al-Qaeda's top operative in Yemen laid out his blueprint for how to wage jihad in letters sent to a fellow extremist.
In what reads like a lesson plan for the less-experienced jihadist, Nasser al-Wahishi, who spent years as Osama bin Laden's personal secretary, provides a step-by-step assessment of what worked and what didn't in Yemen.
Yet in the never-before-seen correspondence discovered by The Associated Press, the man at the centre of the latest terror threat barely mentions the extremist methods that have transformed his organization into al-Qaeda's most dangerous branch.
Instead, he urges his jihadist colleague whose fighters had just seized northern Mali to make sure the people living in the areas they have just conquered have electricity and running water. And he offers tips for making garbage collection more efficient.
“Try to win them over through the conveniences of life,” he writes. “It will make them sympathize with us and make them feel that their fate is tied to ours.”
The perhaps surprising hearts-and-minds approach advocated by the 30-something Wahishi is a sign of a broader shift within al-Qaeda, according to experts shown the two letters and an accompanying report. After its failure in Iraq, the terror network realized that it is not enough to win territory —They must also learn to govern it if they hope to hold it.
“People in the West view al-Qaeda as only a terrorist organization, and it certainly is that... but the group itself is much broader, and it is doing much more,” says Gregory Johnsen, a scholar at Princeton University whose book, The Last Refuge, charts the rise of al-Qaeda in Yemen. “The group sees itself as an organization that can be a government.”
The correspondence from al-Wahishi to Algerian national Abdelmalek Droukdel is part of a cache of documents found earlier this year by the AP in buildings in Timbuktu, which until January served as the headquarters of al-Qaeda's North African branch. The letters are dated May 21 and Aug. 6, 2012, soon after al-Wahishi's army in Yemen was forced to retreat from the territory it had seized amid an uprising against long-time Yemeni ruler Ali Abdullah Saleh.
Al-Wahishi's advice is drawn from his own experience trying to hold and govern a slice of southern Yemen for 16 months. At the time, the terror network as a whole was trying to come to grips with its losses in Iraq, where people rose up against brutal punishments including executions for watching the soccer World Cup on television.
The failure of Iraq was front and centre in how al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula went about governing its provinces in Yemen, including the region where al-Wahishi was born, says Robin Simcox, research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society, whose recently published study chronicles the group's occupation of southern Yemen.
In the May letter, al-Wahishi warns his counterpart not to crack down too quickly or too harshly.
“You have to be kind,” he writes. “You can't beat people for drinking alcohol when they don't even know the basics of how to pray. ...Try to avoid enforcing Islamic punishments as much as possible, unless you are forced to do so. ... We used this approach with the people and came away with good results.”
Al-Qaeda's foray into governance in southern Yemen began on the morning of Feb. 28, 2011, when residents of the locality of Jaar woke up to find an ominous black flag flying over their town. Fearing the worst, the population was mystified to discover that their occupiers appeared more interested in public works projects, than in waging war.
“There were around 200 of them. They were wearing Afghan clothes, black robes that go to the knees, with a belt,” said Nabil Al—Amoudi, a lawyer from Jaar. “They started extending water mains. ... They installed their own pipes. They succeeded in bringing electricity to areas that had not had power before.”
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula chronicled their achievements in 22 issues of a newsletter and in propaganda films showing glowing light bulbs and whirring fans inside the homes of villagers who had never had power before. In one video, al-Qaeda fighters are seen leaning ladders against power poles and triumphantly yelling “Allah Akbar,” or “God is great,” each time they connect a downed wire.
Al-Wahishi's group was forced to retreat from southern Yemen in June of 2012, just as al-Qaeda's affiliate in North Africa succeeded in grabbing control of an Afghanistan-sized chunk of northern Mali, giving the terror network another chance to try their hand at governing.
Adopting an avuncular, almost professorial tone, al-Wahishi advises Droukdel to not only pay special attention to the minutiae of running a mini-state, but to also publicize his efforts. He advises them to appoint a spokesman and court the media to change people's perception of the terror brand.
“The world is waiting to see what you do next and how you go about managing the affairs of your state,” he writes. “Your enemies want to see you fail and they're throwing up obstacles to prove to people that the mujahedeen are people that are only good for fighting and war, and have nothing to do with running countries.”
This preoccupation with al-Qaeda's image is clear throughout the letters. The former U.S. ambassador to Yemen, Stephen Seche, says the letters from al-Wahishi are in large part about the group's perception of itself.
“These guys are no longer in the business of just trying to take out Western targets. They are in the business of establishing themselves as legit alternatives to governments that are not present in areas on a daily business,” says Seche, who was posted to Yemen between 2007 and 2010. “I don't think we should be fooled by this. ...This is a velvet glove approach. It will come off.”
For many in Yemen, the glove came off on Feb. 11, 2012, when a man accused of spying was arrested and sentenced to death by crucifixion. No amount of time or gradual application of Shariah could have prepared the population for what came next.
Al-Wahishi does not acknowledge losing the support of the population, though he concedes his men were forced to retreat, as Yemen's army, backed by the U.S. military, regained control of the south. He explains that they pulled out after concluding that resisting would have both drained their resources, and caused high civilian casualties.
Al-Wahishi is blunt in laying out the cost of al-Qaeda's foray and how it was financed.
“The control of these areas during one year cost us 500 martyrs, 700 wounded, 10 cases of hand or leg amputation and nearly $20 million,” he writes. “Most of the battle costs, if not all, were paid for through the spoils. Almost half the spoils came from hostages. Kidnapping hostages is an easy spoil, which I may describe as a profitable trade and a precious treasure.”
In conclusion, al-Wahishi warns Droukdel not to be drawn into a prolonged war. He effectively recommends the strategy al-Qaeda used in both Yemen and Mali — Melt into the background while preparing to strike again — “Hold on to your previous bases in the mountains, forests and deserts and prepare other refuges for the worst-case scenario,” he says. “This is what we came to realize after our withdrawal.”
Al-Wahishi, a tiny man with a pointy beard, spent years serving as Osama bin Laden's personal assistant, before returning to his native Yemen, where he was named the emir of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in 2002.
In 2009, the Yemeni branch of al-Qaeda attempted to send a suicide bomber with explosives sown into his underwear onto a Detroit-bound flight.
U.S. officials recently intercepted a communication between al-Wahishi and al-Qaeda supreme chief Ayman al-Zawahri, causing the U.S. to shutter 19 embassies and consulates.
Although al-Qaeda has been on a learning curve since Iraq, it still does not seem to understand how to govern populations used to a far more moderate form of Islam. Al-Qaeda experts say this extremism is a permanent Achilles' heel for the terror franchise their final destination jars, regardless of how slowly they drive to get there.
“The question is, are these groups always fated to overplay their hand?” asks Simcox. “They are so ideological, that they will always veer in this direction.”
In what reads like a lesson plan for the less-experienced jihadist, Nasser al-Wahishi, who spent years as Osama bin Laden's personal secretary, provides a step-by-step assessment of what worked and what didn't in Yemen.
Yet in the never-before-seen correspondence discovered by The Associated Press, the man at the centre of the latest terror threat barely mentions the extremist methods that have transformed his organization into al-Qaeda's most dangerous branch.
Instead, he urges his jihadist colleague whose fighters had just seized northern Mali to make sure the people living in the areas they have just conquered have electricity and running water. And he offers tips for making garbage collection more efficient.
“Try to win them over through the conveniences of life,” he writes. “It will make them sympathize with us and make them feel that their fate is tied to ours.”
The perhaps surprising hearts-and-minds approach advocated by the 30-something Wahishi is a sign of a broader shift within al-Qaeda, according to experts shown the two letters and an accompanying report. After its failure in Iraq, the terror network realized that it is not enough to win territory —They must also learn to govern it if they hope to hold it.
“People in the West view al-Qaeda as only a terrorist organization, and it certainly is that... but the group itself is much broader, and it is doing much more,” says Gregory Johnsen, a scholar at Princeton University whose book, The Last Refuge, charts the rise of al-Qaeda in Yemen. “The group sees itself as an organization that can be a government.”
The correspondence from al-Wahishi to Algerian national Abdelmalek Droukdel is part of a cache of documents found earlier this year by the AP in buildings in Timbuktu, which until January served as the headquarters of al-Qaeda's North African branch. The letters are dated May 21 and Aug. 6, 2012, soon after al-Wahishi's army in Yemen was forced to retreat from the territory it had seized amid an uprising against long-time Yemeni ruler Ali Abdullah Saleh.
Al-Wahishi's advice is drawn from his own experience trying to hold and govern a slice of southern Yemen for 16 months. At the time, the terror network as a whole was trying to come to grips with its losses in Iraq, where people rose up against brutal punishments including executions for watching the soccer World Cup on television.
The failure of Iraq was front and centre in how al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula went about governing its provinces in Yemen, including the region where al-Wahishi was born, says Robin Simcox, research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society, whose recently published study chronicles the group's occupation of southern Yemen.
In the May letter, al-Wahishi warns his counterpart not to crack down too quickly or too harshly.
“You have to be kind,” he writes. “You can't beat people for drinking alcohol when they don't even know the basics of how to pray. ...Try to avoid enforcing Islamic punishments as much as possible, unless you are forced to do so. ... We used this approach with the people and came away with good results.”
Al-Qaeda's foray into governance in southern Yemen began on the morning of Feb. 28, 2011, when residents of the locality of Jaar woke up to find an ominous black flag flying over their town. Fearing the worst, the population was mystified to discover that their occupiers appeared more interested in public works projects, than in waging war.
“There were around 200 of them. They were wearing Afghan clothes, black robes that go to the knees, with a belt,” said Nabil Al—Amoudi, a lawyer from Jaar. “They started extending water mains. ... They installed their own pipes. They succeeded in bringing electricity to areas that had not had power before.”
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula chronicled their achievements in 22 issues of a newsletter and in propaganda films showing glowing light bulbs and whirring fans inside the homes of villagers who had never had power before. In one video, al-Qaeda fighters are seen leaning ladders against power poles and triumphantly yelling “Allah Akbar,” or “God is great,” each time they connect a downed wire.
Al-Wahishi's group was forced to retreat from southern Yemen in June of 2012, just as al-Qaeda's affiliate in North Africa succeeded in grabbing control of an Afghanistan-sized chunk of northern Mali, giving the terror network another chance to try their hand at governing.
Adopting an avuncular, almost professorial tone, al-Wahishi advises Droukdel to not only pay special attention to the minutiae of running a mini-state, but to also publicize his efforts. He advises them to appoint a spokesman and court the media to change people's perception of the terror brand.
“The world is waiting to see what you do next and how you go about managing the affairs of your state,” he writes. “Your enemies want to see you fail and they're throwing up obstacles to prove to people that the mujahedeen are people that are only good for fighting and war, and have nothing to do with running countries.”
This preoccupation with al-Qaeda's image is clear throughout the letters. The former U.S. ambassador to Yemen, Stephen Seche, says the letters from al-Wahishi are in large part about the group's perception of itself.
“These guys are no longer in the business of just trying to take out Western targets. They are in the business of establishing themselves as legit alternatives to governments that are not present in areas on a daily business,” says Seche, who was posted to Yemen between 2007 and 2010. “I don't think we should be fooled by this. ...This is a velvet glove approach. It will come off.”
For many in Yemen, the glove came off on Feb. 11, 2012, when a man accused of spying was arrested and sentenced to death by crucifixion. No amount of time or gradual application of Shariah could have prepared the population for what came next.
Al-Wahishi does not acknowledge losing the support of the population, though he concedes his men were forced to retreat, as Yemen's army, backed by the U.S. military, regained control of the south. He explains that they pulled out after concluding that resisting would have both drained their resources, and caused high civilian casualties.
Al-Wahishi is blunt in laying out the cost of al-Qaeda's foray and how it was financed.
“The control of these areas during one year cost us 500 martyrs, 700 wounded, 10 cases of hand or leg amputation and nearly $20 million,” he writes. “Most of the battle costs, if not all, were paid for through the spoils. Almost half the spoils came from hostages. Kidnapping hostages is an easy spoil, which I may describe as a profitable trade and a precious treasure.”
In conclusion, al-Wahishi warns Droukdel not to be drawn into a prolonged war. He effectively recommends the strategy al-Qaeda used in both Yemen and Mali — Melt into the background while preparing to strike again — “Hold on to your previous bases in the mountains, forests and deserts and prepare other refuges for the worst-case scenario,” he says. “This is what we came to realize after our withdrawal.”
Al-Wahishi, a tiny man with a pointy beard, spent years serving as Osama bin Laden's personal assistant, before returning to his native Yemen, where he was named the emir of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in 2002.
In 2009, the Yemeni branch of al-Qaeda attempted to send a suicide bomber with explosives sown into his underwear onto a Detroit-bound flight.
U.S. officials recently intercepted a communication between al-Wahishi and al-Qaeda supreme chief Ayman al-Zawahri, causing the U.S. to shutter 19 embassies and consulates.
Although al-Qaeda has been on a learning curve since Iraq, it still does not seem to understand how to govern populations used to a far more moderate form of Islam. Al-Qaeda experts say this extremism is a permanent Achilles' heel for the terror franchise their final destination jars, regardless of how slowly they drive to get there.
“The question is, are these groups always fated to overplay their hand?” asks Simcox. “They are so ideological, that they will always veer in this direction.”